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SECURITIES
OVERVIEW
Four recent decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit' have clarified the court's position on issues central to securi-
ties litigation. This survey will examine the decisions and the questions with
which each dealt in the following order: first, the problem of when the fed-
eral equitable tolling doctrine applies to statutes of limitations in securities
fraud cases;2 second, whether purchases of lots in a real estate development,
combined with the sellers' promises to develop the property, constitute a "se-
curity";3 third, what the required standards and burdens of proof are in es-
tablishing a conflict of interest in violation of the Investment Company Act
of 1940;4 fourth, what degree of wrongful intent is required for aiding and
abetting a violation of that Act;5 and fifth, whether a private right of action
under rule lOb-5 6 extends to a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief to prevent
the defendant from issuing securities for the purpose of financing litigation
against the plaintiff, where the securities consisted of agreements to share
money recovered in the lawsuit.7
I. TOLLING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN FEDERAL
SECURITIES CASES
In Aldnch v. McCulloch Properties, Inc. ,8 the plaintiffs, who purchased sub-
divided lots in the defendants' real estate development, sought to recover
their investment under several federal securities provisions, as well as under
the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (ILSFDA),9 and under various
common law theories. 10 However, the plaintiffs did not file their lawsuit
1. Ohio v. Peterson, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1981); Decker v. SEC, 631 F.2d 1380 (10th
Cir. 1980); Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1980); Westinghouse
Credit Corp. v. Bader & Dufty, 627 F.2d 221 (10th Cir. 1980).
2. Ohio v. Peterson, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1981); Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc.,
627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1980).
3. Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1980).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-I (1976); Decker v. SEC, 631 F.2d 1380 (10th Cir. 1980).
5. Decker v. SEC, 631 F.2d 1380 (10th Cir. 1980).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981), which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
7. Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Bader & Dufty, 627 F.2d 221 (10th Cir. 1980).
8. 627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1980).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976).
10. 627 F.2d at 1038.
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until more than eight years after they had purchased the lots in question.I
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado ruled that the
applicable statutes of limitations barred all the plaintiffs' claims.1
2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit partly af-
firmed and partly reversed the district court's decision, and held that while
the claims under the ILSFDA were indeed barred, the claims under the se-
curities laws were not. 13 According to the court of appeals, the federal equi-
table tolling doctrine protected the plaintiffs' securities violations claims
from summary disposal, even though the limitations period had expired, be-
cause the plaintiffs had asserted facts supporting the allegation that the de-
fendants concealed the fraud until the limitations period had run.
1 4
Since the federal securities provisions under which the plaintiffs sued do
not contain a limitations period, the court adopted the policy delineated by
the United States Supreme Court in Ernst &Ernst v. Hochfelder: '5 whenever a
remedy is judicially implied (as in, for example, a rule lOb-5 action),' 16 and
no statute of limitations is provided, the forum state's limitations period is
adopted.' 7 Colorado law provides a three-year limitations period for fraud
actions.' 8 Under normal legal principles, this alone would not have helped
the plaintiffs, who sued more than eight years after signing the contract com-
plained of.'9 However, as stated above, the court utilized federal equitable
tolling principles to delay the operation of the Colorado statute of
limitations.
The equitable tolling doctrine is based on the premise that a plaintiff in
a fraud case should not be penalized when the defendant conceals the fraud
so efficiently that even if the plaintiff is diligent, the fraud remains hidden
until it is too late to bring suit. The United States Supreme Court recog-
11. Id.
12. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 1711 (1976) (amended 1979); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-80-108,-109
(1973).
13. 627 F.2d at 1041-42.
14. Id. at 1042.
15. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
16. Id. at 210 n.29.
17. 627 F.2d at 1041 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 210 n.29). The court
also cited Nickels v. Koehler Mgmt. Corp., 541 F.2d 611, 613 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1074 (1977) (where no federal statute of limitations exists, federal courts must implement
the state statute of limitations which best effectuates the policy objectives of the federal remedy
provided). See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946), where the Supreme Court
stated:
If Congress explicitly puts a limit upon the time for enforcing a right which it created
there is an end of the matter. The Congressional statute of limitation is definitive
.... The rub comes when Congress is silent. . . . [Tihe silence of Congress has
been interpreted to mean that it is federal policy to adopt the local law of limitation
.... The implied absorption of State statutes of limitation within the interstices of
the federal enactments is a phase of fashioning remedial details where Congress has
not spoken but left matters for judicial determination within the general framework of
familiar legal principles.
See also I A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD
§ 2.5(1) at 41-42 (1981).
18. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-80-108, -109 (1973). Section 13-80-109 states that "[blills for
relief on the ground of fraud shall be filed within three years after the discovery by the ag-
grieved party of the facts constituting such fraud, and not afterwards."
19. 627 F.2d at 1038.
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nized this problem in Bailey v. Glover,2 ° a bankruptcy case, and summarized
the doctrine: "[w]here the ignorance of the fraud has been produced by af-
firmative acts of the guilty party in concealing the facts from the other, the
statute will not bar relief provided suit is brought within proper time after
the discovery of the fraud."'2 1 The Court also held that the equitable tolling
doctrine applies to actions at law as well as in equity.
22
The Bailey holding was reaffirmed in Exploration Co. v. United States,23 a
Colorado land patent fraud case in which the Court allowed the United
States government to benefit from the equitable tolling doctrine. 24 The doc-
trine was further clarified in Holmberg v. Armbrecht,2 5 where the Court held
that in federal actions, equitable tolling principles apply to federal as well as
to state statutes of limitations regardless of whether an action is grounded in
fraud: "[tjhis equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute of limita-
tion. . . . It would be too incongruous to confine a federal right within the
bare terms of a State statute of limitation unrelieved by the settled federal
equitable doctrine."
26
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Aldrich followed Supreme Court
decisions and reaffirmed its own precedents in applying federal tolling rules
to state statutes of limitation. Nine years before Aldrich, the court held that
"it is a matter of federal law as to the circumstances that will toll a state
statute applied to private actions under the securities laws."
2 7
The federal equitable tolling doctrine has no effect on the ILSFDA stat-
ute of limitations.28 The court emphasized that equitable principles are
read into state and federal statutes of limitations only if no contrary intent
appears. 29 Unlike the federal securities statutes discussed in Aldrich,3° the
20. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342 (1874).
21. Id. at 347-48.
22. Id. at 349. See text accompanying notes 58-61 infra.
23. 247 U.S. 435 (1918).
24. Id. at 446, 449-50.
25. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
26. Id. at 397. See Comment, Fraudulent Concealment as Tolling the Antitrust S atute of Limita-
tions, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 328, 329-30 (1967). See also Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359
U.S. 231 (1959), where the statute of limitations was tolled because the defendants fraudulently
represented it to be longer than it actually was.
27. DeHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 1970) (citing Esplin
v. Hirschi. 402 F.2d 94, 103 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. dented, 394 U.S. 928 (1969)). The limitations
period begins to run from the date the plaintiff has actual or constructive notice of the fraud.
Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 599 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1979); Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1974). See also Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 784
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); Public Serv. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 315 F.2d 306 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963); 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 17, at 42.
28. 627 F.2d at 1042; 15 U.S.C. § 1711 (1976) (amended 1979). A plaintiff alleging a
fraudulent land sale may sue both under the ILSFDA and under the securities laws; neither
cause of action precludes the other. 627 F.2d at 1039 n.2; Jenne v. Amrep Corp., [1978] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,343, at 93,166 (D.N.J. Feb. 14, 1978).
29. 627 F.2d at 1042 (citing Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. at 234 (equitable
estoppel applies to toll the Federal Employers' Liability Act statute of limitations where the
language of the Act does not preclude such an application); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S.
at 395.
30. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1981); Securities Act of 1933 § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77(q) (1976).
1982]
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ILSFDA contains a three-year statute of limitations.3 1 The court found that
Congress intended this limitation period to be absolute and not susceptible
to extension under the federal equitable tolling doctrine, "notwithstanding
allegations of fraudulent concealment.
'32
Thus, according to the Aldrich court, congressional intent overrides the
general rule, embraced by the United States Supreme Court, that the equi-
table tolling doctrine is "read into every federal statute of limitation. ' '33 The
language of the ILSFDA statute of limitations indicates such a contrary con-
gressional intent, that is, an intent to render the limitations period absolute
notwithstanding extenuating circumstances. 34 At the time the lawsuit was
brought, the ILSFDA statute of limitations concluded with the statement
that "[i]n no event shall any such action be brought by a purchaser more
than three years after the sale or 'lease to such purchaser."'35 The court, fol-
lowing Illinois federal district court precedent, 36 ruled that this language
created "an absolute bar to untimely suits under the ILSFDA. ' '37 The
ILSFDA statute of limitations begins to run from the time the initial con-
tract is signed, not, as the plaintiffs suggested, from the time all installments
on the contract are paid.
3 8
The 4drich court inserted a note of caution: While the language of the
ILSFDA statute of limitations definitely precludes its extension through the
federal equitable tolling doctrine, other equitable doctrines are not fore-
closed. The ILSFDA statute of limitations may be tolled by the principle of
equitable estoppel when the wrongdoer persuades his victim not to sue until
it is too late.
39
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1711 (1976) (amended 1979). This statute was amended to provide a
three-year limitation period for all ILSFDA violations, instead of varying limitations with an
"in no event" provision attached. See text accompanying note 35 in7fa. See also H.R. REP. No.
154, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 38, repniedin [19791 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2317, 2354. In
light of this change, it is uncertain whether the Aldrich ruling still applies to post-1979 actions
under the ILSFDA.
32. 627 F.2d at 1043.
33. Id. at 1042 (citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. at 397).
34. 627 F.2d at 1042-43. The court pointed out that the interpretation of the ILSFDA
statute of limitations as absolute accords with an identical interpretation generally given to the
statute of limitations under § 13 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1976), upon
which the ILSFDA is based. 627 F.2d at 1043. See, e.g., Brick v. Dominion Mtg. & Realty
Trust, 442 F. Supp. 283, 291 (W.D. N.Y. 1977). However, there are federal decisions sanction-
ing the tolling or extension of the ILSFDA statute of limitations. See, e.g., Lukenas v. Bryce's
Mountain Resort, Inc., 538 F.2d 594, 597 (4th Cir. 1976); Fuls v. Shastina Properties, Inc., 448
F. Supp. 983, 987-88 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Fogel v. Sellamerica, Ltd., 445 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (S.D.
N.Y. 1978) (monthly payments on fraudulent land contract constitute fresh violations of the
ILSFDA, hence the two-year statute of limitations has not run, even though the purchase agree-
ment was signed two years before the plaintiffs sued on it); Happy Inv. Group v. Lakeworld
Properties, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175, 188 (N.D. Cal. 1975). In Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp.
396, 408-09 (N.D. Il1. 1977), upon which the A/dnrh court relied, the court tolled the two-year
ILSFDA statute of limitations, even while it refused to toll the three-year "in no event" limita-
tions period. Se text accompanying note 35 infra.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1711 (1976) (amended 1979).
36. 627 F.2d at 1043; Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. at 408-09.
37. 627 F.2d at 1043.
38. Id. at 1043-44. But see Fogel v. Sellamerica, Ltd., 445 F. Supp. at 1274.
39. 627 F.2d at 1043 n.7. See Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. at 233-34;
Bomba v. W.L. Belvidere, Inc., 579 F.2d 1067 (7th Cir. 1978).
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In regard to the equitable tolling of limitations periods, the Aldrich opin-
ion left two questions unanswered. The first is whether a recent Supreme
Court case, Board of Regents v. Tomanzo,40 prohibits the application of the fed-
eral equitable tolling doctrine to state statutes of limitations in federal securi-
ties cases. In Tomanio, the Supreme Court held that in a civil rights action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal courts must apply both state statutes of limi-
tations and state equitable tolling principles. 4 1 The.41dnch court declined to
decide this issue, since "the state and federal tolling rules here coincide."
'42
It also skirted the question of how to dispose of the issue of the plaintiff's
diligence. It is indisputable that equitable tolling principles do not rescue a
lax plaintiff who would have discovered the fraud in the exercise of reason-
able diligence.4 3 However, the Aldrich holding did not specify whether the
issue of due diligence could be disposed of in a motion for summary judg-
ment, or if it is an issue for determination by the finder of fact. 4 4 A subse-
quent Tenth Circuit case, Ohio v. Peterson,45 answered both questions.
On October 7, 1976, the State of Ohio (Ohio) brought a securities fraud
action against a lawyer, Lowry, and the law firm which had represented a
bankrupt enterprise, King Resources Company (KRC). The lawsuit was ini-
tiated six years after Ohio had purchased promissory notes from KRC. The
Federal District Court for the District of Colorado summarily dismissed the
action because the limitations period had expired.46 Ohio appealed from
the summary judgment, arguing that the limitations period should have
been stayed until January 5, 1976, when Lowry's involvement in the fraud
allegedly was discovered.
4 7
The court of appeals first addressed the question of whether Tomanio
undermines the Tenth Circuit rule "that in fraud cases only the limitations
period is borrowed from state law, whereas the tolling rule is supplied by
40. 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
41. Id. at 484-85.
42. 627 F.2d at 1041. In reaching this conclusion, the court compared the federal cases of
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. at 397, Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 347, and
deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d at 1225-26, with the Colorado cases of Wright of
Nelson, 125 Colo. 217, 226-27, 242 P.2d 243, 247-48 (1952), and Pipe v. Smith, 5 Colo. 146, 158
(1879) ("IT]he statute commenced to run upon the discovery of the facts constituting the
fraud.") The court also pointed to a Colorado statute of limitations, CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-
80-109 (1973), which states, "[bills for relief on the ground of fraud shall be filed within' three
years after the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting such fraud, and not
afterwards."
43. See, e.g., Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d at 171;
deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d at 1226; Greco v. Pullara, 166 Colo. 465, 467, 444
P.2d 383, 383 (1968); Pipe v. Smith, 5 Colo. at 159.
44. 627 F.2d at 1042. The court did state that "[tihe question of whether a plaintiff should
have discovered the basis of his suit under the doctrine of equitable tolling does not lend itself to
determination as a matter of law." Id. Yet, the court held the trial court's dismissal of the
securities claims on the pleadings "improper," id., only because facts were pled that complicated
the due diligence issue. Id. at 1041-42.
45. 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1981).
46. Id. at 689.
47. Id. at 690. Lowry had made certain revelations in a deposition. Ohio claimed that
despite its exercise of due diligence, it had no way of knowing about Lowry's complicity until
the deposition, since the court had imposed a stay of discovery during earlier litigation in the
same case. Id. at 690-91.
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federal jurisprudence."'48 This doctrine had been derived originally from the
United States Supreme Court case ofHolmberg v. Armbrecht.4 9 The Ohio court
decided that Tomamo applies only to actions under federal civil rights provi-
sions. 50 The court reasoned that allowing the Tomano holding to expand
beyond the borders of civil rights and invade the securities regulation terri-
tory would effectively overrule Holmberg, "a decision whose continuing vital-
ity is attested by the many cases relying upon it in § 10(b) private actions.
5 1
Having decided that federal equitable tolling rules do apply to toll Col-
orado's limitations period whenever justice so requires, the court next turned
to the problem of whether the question of the plaintiffs diligence may be
decided in a motion for summary judgment (as permitted by federal law),
52
or whether it must be submitted to the finder of fact (as Colorado law re-
quires). 53 The plaintiff argued that diligence in discovering the fraud is a
jury question, and that the trial court's summary judgment was therefore
invalid.54 The court disagreed, and ruled that in this matter, federal prece-
dent was preferable because the law of diligence should relate to securities
fraud alone, rather than to vigilant discovery of any given cause of action.
55
Federal judges within the Tenth Circuit therefore are empowered to
decide summarily whether a plaintiff who failed to discover the fraud within
the limitations period was sufficiently diligent so as to merit suspension of
the limitations period until the date the plaintiff actually discovered the
cause of action. 56 The Ohio court explained that the rationale of allowing
federal judges such discretion is steeped in English and Early American pre-
cedent: "[i]n equity the issue of diligence was decided by the chancellor
often on written petitions as opposed to live testimony-a procedure much
like our summary judgment . . .57
Even though the tolling doctrine is of equitable origin, many legisla-
tures, English and American, have codified it in order to apply it to statutes
of limitations in legal actions as well as to the laches principle in equity. 58
The equitable rule continues to exist, and has been applied in cases at law
where a statutory tolling rule does not exist. 59 Because of the equitable ori-
gins of the tolling doctrine, the court decided that "there remains some room
48. Id. at 691 (emphasis in original).
49. 327 U.S. 392 (1946). See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
50. 651 F.2d at 691.
51. Id.
52. For a discussion of the applicable federal law, see id. at 692-94.
53. Id. at 692. See Owens v. Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970); Norton v.
Leadville Corp., 610 P.2d 1348 (Colo. App.), cert. dented, 449 U.S. 993 (1980).
54. 651 F.2d at 692.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 693-94. The court may have resolved a conflict within the Tenth Circuit on this
issue. Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d at 1042, and Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d at 172, could be cited in favor of jury resolution of the
diligence issue, while Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 599 F.2d 394, 399-400 (10th Cir. 1979) affirmed
the trial court's summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had had sufficient notice of
the fraud before the limitations period had run out.
57. 651 F.2d at 693. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
58. 651 F.2d at 693.
59. Id. Actions under the federal securities laws are a prime example of such an applica-
tion. The Ohio court quoted Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 349: "[wle see no reason
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for discretion by the court on the issue of plaintiff's discovery and diligence
in cases under § 10(b) when the pleadings show that the action would be
time-barred but for the equitable doctrine. '60 Thus, the Ohio court held
that the question of whether to toll the statute of limitations in a securities
fraud action may be decided by the trial court pursuant to a motion for
summary judgment.
6 1
In dicta the court noted that summary disposition of the statute of limi-
tations question is desirable from a policy standpoint. The policy behind
statutes of limitations is one of repose,62 of preventing vexatious and pro-
tracted litigation, crowded dockets, delays resulting in ineffective evidence,
contingent liabilities, and absent witnesses. 63 Making the statute of limita-
tions defense a jury question "defeats the statute's purpose of preventing tri-
als of stale claims." 64 In actions under section 10(b), where multiple lawsuits
may result from the same transaction, the interest in avoiding outdated law-
suits is especially strong.
65
The court next turned to the level of proof needed to support summary
judgment based on a statute of limitations, and decided that summary dispo-
sition is appropriate where the defendant shows that the plaintiff would have
discovered the fraud before the statute of limitations expired if reasonable
diligence had been exercised. 66 This diligence is required regardless of
whether the defendant actively attempted to cover up his wrongdoing. The
court rejected the defendant's view that attempts to prevent discovery of the
fraud tolls the statute of limitations "until actual discovery regardless of dili-
gence." 6 7 If the evidence before the court is insufficient to demonstrate the
plaintiff's lack of diligence, the statute of limitations issue becomes a jury
question to be decided by a preponderance of the evidence.68
The court cautioned that it would uphold the trial court's exercise of
discretion only in cases involving material misstatements about publicly
traded securities. 69 Trial courts may have less discretion in summarily rul-
ing on statute of limitations questions in private fraud actions under section
10(b).
70
The trial court's summary judgment was sustained on several grounds.
why the principle [of equitable tolling] should not be as applicable to suits tried on the com-
mon-law side of the court's calendar as to those on the equity side."
60. 651 F.2d at 693.
61. Id. at 693-94. The court, citing Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d at
1042, acknowledged that "the question of whether a plaintiff should have discovered the basis of
his suit under the doctrine of equitable tolling does not lend itself to determination as a matter
of law." 651 F.2d at 693 n.13. Nevertheless, the court added that this issue is properly subjected
to the discretion of the trial judge, because of the equitable origins of tolling. Id.




66. Id. Thus, the court ruled that in the Tenth Circuit, "there is but one federal doctrine
of equitable tolling, as set forth in Holmberg v. Armbrecht." Id. at 694-95.
67. Id. at 694.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 694 n. 15.
70. Id. Adriih and Dzerits were private fraud actions under § 10(b), and in both cases the
Tenth Circuit was pessimistic about a trial judge's ability to determine adequately the question
19821
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Pleadings in previous lawsuits on the same facts and involving the same de-
fendant had revealed information about Lowry's role in the fraud. The
plaintiff, if diligent, would have obtained the pleadings and the information
contained in them long before the statute of limitations precluded the law-
suit. 7' Mere allegations are sufficient to set the limitations period running;
such allegations need not be "supported by hard evidence."' 72 Thus the
plaintiff had three years7 3 after actual or constructive discovery of the fraud
in which to obtain evidence sufficient to support a lawsuit. The plaintiff also
could have obtained more time for investigation by filing a timely lawsuit,
thereby taking advantage of extensions granted for pre-trial discovery.
74
Additionally, Ohio's knowledge that Lowry signed a fraudulent letter of cer-
tification, structured the allegedly unsavory transaction, and prepared the
relevant documents provided further justification for the trial court's en-
forcement of the limitations period.
75
II. ARE SUBDIVIDED REAL ESTATE LOTS SECURITIES?
In Aldrich v. McCullocA Properties, Inc. ,76 the plaintiffs' amended com-
plaint alleged that they had purchased real estate lots for investment pur-
poses, after having been enticed by the defendants' promises of appreciations
in property value stemming from construction activities on the lots. 77 The
lots, therefore, were securities for purposes of the federal securities laws, ac-
cording to the plaintiffs.78
The trial court dismissed the allegations because the necessary elements
of a security were not averred in the complaint. 79 The court of appeals re-
manded the case to the trial court without deciding whether the lots consti-
tuted securities, holding only that the plaintiffs' allegations were "sufficient
to preclude determination of this issue on a Rule 12(b) motion." a
The plaintiffs had asserted that the lots, together with the defendants'
promises to develop them, were "investment contracts" and therefore securi-
ties under section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 193381 and section 3(a)(10) of
of diligence. Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d at 1042; Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d at 172.
71. 651 F.2d at 695.
72. Id.
73. CoLO. REv. STAT. §§ 13-80-108, -109 (1973).
74. 651 F.2d at 695.
75. Id.
76. 627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1980). The plaintiffs sued under the federal securities laws, as
well as under the ILSFDA. A lawsuit under the ILSFDA does not preclude analogous claims
under the federal securities laws. Id. at 1039 n.2; Jenne v. Amrep Corp., [1978] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) $ 96,343 at 93,166 (D. N.J. Feb. 14, 1978). See Securities Act Release No. 5347,
[1972-73] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 79,163 at 82,536 (Jan. 4, 1973): "[t]he offer of real estate
as such, without any collateral arrangements with the seller or others, does not involve the offer
of a security. When the real estate is offered in conjunction with certain services, a security, in
the form of an investment contract, may be present."
77. 627 F.2d at 1039.
78. Id. at 1038.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1976).
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the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.82 The court stated that this was a fac-
tual question-from the plaintiffs' allegations one could infer either an in-
vestment in a common enterprise, which is a security, or merely an ordinary
real estate purchase.8 3 Thus, the court set out guidelines for the trial court's
use in determining whether the sale of a security actually had occurred.
8 4
The court first applied the test formulated in SEC v. W.J. Howey, Inc. ,85
to determine whether the transaction in Aldrich constituted an investment
contract. Howey defines an investment contract as a "contract, transaction,
or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is
led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party." 86 The plaintiffs' allegations may have satisfied the Howey require-
ments: the plaintiffs claimed the defendants promised to develop the subdi-
vided lots, provide amenities, and establish a trust "to construct and operate
facilities for their common benefit."8 7 It did not matter that the plaintiffs
expected no profits until the property was resold. A transaction may involve
an investment contract, and therefore a security, as long as there is an intent
to invest and the profits arise from capital appreciation resulting from devel-
opment of the initial investment. 88 The court cautioned that while "capital
appreciation" resulting from planned development characterizes a security,
ordinary appreciation in property values resulting from random neighbor-
hood growth and improvements does not.8 9
Furthermore, the lots could have constituted a security even if they were
subdivided, that is, sold in individual parcels rather than in undivided shares
similar to shares of stock: "[a] common enterprise does not require the sale
of undivided interests or an entirely separable and express management con-
tract." 9 Since it was necessary to analyze the underlying transaction care-
fully to determine whether the characteristics of an investment contract were
present, the Aldrich court remanded the case to the trial court for this very
purpose: "[wihile. . . it could be inferred that what plaintiffs purchased was
not an investment in a common enterprise but merely individual parcels of
real estate, resolution of these conflicting inferences was inappropriate with-
out greater factual exploration." 91
The court next turned to the test expounded in SEC v. C M. Joiner Leas-
82. Id. § 78c(a)(l0).
83. 627 F.2d at 1039-40.
84. Id.
85. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
86. Id. at 298-99.
87. 627 F.2d at 1039.
88. Id. (citing United Housing Found'n, Inc., v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975)). See
also Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. at 401.
89. 627 F.2d at 1039 n.I.
90. Id. at 1039. The court was referring to the holding of SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the sale of oil
lease assignments, where the lessees were to drill for oil on individually owned parcels of prop-
erty, involved "a form of investment contract in which the purchaser was paying both for a
lease and for a development project." 320 U.S. at 349.




tg Corp. ,92 which emphasizes the promotional aspect of the securities sale.
This test characterizes a transaction on the basis of what the seller promised:
"[t]he test. . . is what character the instrument is given in commerce by the
terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic inducements
held out to the prospect."'93 Again, this entailed a remand to the trial court
to determine exactly what representations the sellers made.
94
Other criteria set forth in Aldrich included the question of whether the
plaintiffs purchased the lots primarily for residential purposes or for personal
use and enjoyment, without expectation of profit. 95 If so, the lots were not
securities.9 The court also indicated that the trial court should examine
whether the developers were obligated to provide significant development
services, to the extent that the "burden of management and develooment
• . . rest[s] on the developers."'9 7 Thus, minimal managerial functions alone
do not turn a real estate deal into a security. Under Howey, as modified by
SECy. Glenn W. Turner Enlerprses, Inc. ,98 a transaction constitutes a security if
the profits are produced essentially through the efforts of someone other than
the investor.99
III. STANDARDS AND BURDENS OF PROOF IN INVESTMENT
COMPANY VIOLATIONS
In Decker v. SEC, 100 the court decided that the standard of proof needed
to establish violations of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA) 10 '
should be the least restrictive one-preponderance of the evidence--even
though the petitioners argued in favor of a more stringent standard. The
court gave primary consideration to the overall statutory intent to protect
investors, concluding that a liberal standard of proof fulfills this statutory
intent.
The petitioner, Decker, appealed from a Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (Commission) order censuring him for aiding and abetting a viola-
tion of the conflict of interest provisions of the ICA. 02 The alleged conflict
of interest involved the relationships between an investment advisory firm,
the Forum Corporation (Forum) and its subsidiary Forum Investment Coun-
92. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
93. Id. at 352-53.
94. 627 F.2d at 1040. See note 91 supra. The court distinguished Woodward v. Terracor,
574 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1978), in which summary judgment was affirmed on the ground that,
considering the pleadings, the court "failled] to see any common venture or common enterprise
between the plaintiffs and Terracor." 574 F.2d at 1025. See McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204
(10th Cir. 1975), where the court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their pleadings, since they had
raised factual questions that precluded summary judgment, although they had not alleged fed-
eral securities violations.
95. 627 F.2d at 1040.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. dented, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
99. 627 F.2d at 1040 n.3. Seealso SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir.
1974).
100. 631 F.2d 1380 (10th Cir. 1980).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1976).




selors, Inc. (FIC), and a brokerage firm, Jesup & Lamont, Inc. (J & L) and its
subsidiary Jesup & Lamont International Limited U & L International). J &
L International allegedly made illegal payments to FIC to induce Forum to
use J & L to handle the affairs of Forum's clients. Pursuant to a contract,
FIC was to provide investment and research services to J & L International
in exchange for $25,000 per year. The Commission sued, claiming the pay-
ments were actually intended to be, at least in part, compensation to Forum
for increasing its volume of business with J & L. 10 3 The Commission alleged
this was a violation of section 17(e)(1) of the ICA.
10 4
Section 17 of the ICA generally prohibits transactions creating conflicts
of interests in the relationships between investment companies and their in-
vestment advisors, principal underwriters, and other affiliates, without the
Commission's advance approval.' 0 5 Section 17(e)(1) in particular limits the
compensation, regardless of its source, that affiliated agents of registered in-
vestment companies may receive for purchasing or selling property to or on
behalf of the registered investment company.' 0 6 The Commission alleged
that Forum's brokerage business was illegally allocated to its affiliate, J & L,
as a consequence of the agreement between the two firms' subsidiaries.
The case was tried before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ
applied a "clear and convincing" standard of proof, and concluded that the
Commission's Enforcement Division failed to establish a nexus between the
compensation J & L International paid to FIC and the brokerage business
Forum allocated to J & L. The ALJ also decided the Enforcement Division
had not proven that the services performed by FIC for J & L International
were worth less than the $25,000 paid annually from J & L International to
FIC.10 7 The ALJ's decision was appealed to the Commission, which re-
versed and found that Decker willfully aided and abetted a section 17(e)(1)
violation.10 8 The Commission did not discuss the standard of proof it used
in its determinations. Pursuant to section 203(e)(5) of the Investment Advi-
sors Act,' 0 9 the Commission censured Decker for his role in the violation.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Commission's decision on the ground
that the "preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof is the correct
standard to use in establishing ICA violations. Decker had argued that the
intermediate "clear and convincing" standard was proper because the Com-
103. 631 F.2d at 1382.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e)(I) (1976).
105. See Rosenblat & Lybecker, Some Thoughts on the Federal Securities Laws Regulating External
Investment Management Arrangements and the ALI Federal Securities Code Project, 124 U. PA. L. REV.
587, 598 (1976).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e)(1) (1976) provides:
(e) It shall be unlawful for any affiliated person of a registered investment company,
or any affiliated person of such person-
(1) acting as agent, to accept from any source any compensation (other than a
regular salary or wages from such registered company) for the purchase or sale of
any property to or for such registered company or any controlled company
thereof, except in the course of such person's business as an underwriter or
broker ...
107. 631 F.2d at 1383.
108. Id.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(5) (1976).
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mission alleged fraud, which carries potentially severe sanctions.' 10 The
United States Supreme Court had approved the clear and convincing stan-
dard for use in civil cases "involving allegations of fraud or some other quasi-
criminal wrongdoing by the defendant,"' where the interests at stake are
more than merely pecuniary ones and may be reputational, or may involve
individual liberties." 2 The Court established a balancing test to determine
which standard of proof to use in such cases: The individual's interests are
weighed against the interests of society in deciding how to allocate the risk of
error.1 13 In Decker, the court of appeals applied this balancing test and de-
cided in favor of the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. Since the
primary purpose of the ICA is to protect investors, such a purpose takes
priority over the possibility of unjust injury to the defendants involved in the
litigation." 4 Therefore the court found, in balancing individual interests
against those of the public, that "primary consideration must be given to the
statutory intent to protect investors,"' ' 5 and endorsed the use of the "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" standard in cases involving violations of section
17 (e)(1) of the ICA.
The Decker court next stated that because section 17(e)(1) prohibits the
receipt of compensation for the purchase or sale of property to or for an
investment company, a nexus must be established between the compensation
received and the property bought or sold, in order to prove a section 17(e)(1)
violation. The compensation must have been received for the transaction in
question, although intent to influence need not be shown.' 1 6 It is not suffi-
cient merely to show that a conflict of interest existed with respect to the
allocation of brokerage business." 7 The court agreed with Decker that to
interpret section 17(e)(l) to prohibit per se conflicts of interest without re-
quiring a showing of the actual purpose of the compensation received is "too
expansive."' 
1 8
Thus, the court continued, when a conflict of interest is demonstrated,
for example, when the Commission shows that compensation was received in
exchange for the purchase or sale of investment company property, a pre-
sumption of a section 17(e)(l) violation arises. The burden then shifts to the
defendant to show that the compensation creating the conflict of interest was
not in violation of section 17(e)(l). In Decker's case, the compensation re-
ceived in exchange for increased brokerage business presented a presumption
of a violation." 9 The court, in affirming the Commission's ruling and clari-
fying the law, carefully summarized the procedure for proving a section
110. 631 F.2d at 1383-84. Such sanctions include censure, placing of limitations on, or sus-
pension or revocation of, an investment advisor's registration. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(5) (1976).
111. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979).
112. E.g. ,,Addinglon applied the clear and convincing standard to a proceeding to commit an
individual to a state mental hospital indefinitely. Id at 419-20.
113. Id. at 425.
114. 631 F.2d at 1384.
115. Id. (quoting Associated Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 283 F.2d 773, 775 (10th Cir. 1960)).
116. 631 F.2d at 1384-85.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1384.
119. Id. at 1385. See Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168, 175 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
dened, 449 U.S. 919 (1980).
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17(e)(l) violation. First, the Enforcement Division must prove each element
of the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. When the Enforcement
Division presents prima facie evidence of a conflict of interest (in the alloca-
tion of brokerage business, in this case), the burden shifts to the defendant to
show that no compensation was received illegally for the sale or purchase of
investment company property. If the defendant produces such evidence, the
presumption vanishes, and the Commission must "consider all relevant evi-
dence and determine whether the Enforcement Division established its case
by a preponderance of the evidence."'
20
In light of the command to consider all relevant evidence, the court
remanded the case to the Commission for reconsideration of evidence that
the Commission had disregarded. The testimony of Decker's expert wit-
nesses, who testified that the fair market value of the services performed by
FIC for J & L International equalled the sum actually paid, was disregarded
on the ground of subjectivity.' 2' Even though the court expressed doubt
that the transactions would be rendered valid if the services were actually
worth the compensation paid,' 22 it nevertheless remanded the case to the
trial court, stating that no rule of law was known that would permit a court
or agency to discount valuation evidence properly received in the record.'
23
IV. STATE OF MIND AND THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS
One who violates a provision of the ICA may have sanctions levied
against him only if the Commission finds that he acted willfully.' 24 To levy
sanctions against aiders and abettors such as the petitioner in Decker, how-
ever, requires a higher standard. Because aiding and abetting liability is a
still unpolished facet of the securities regulation scheme,125 the Commission
and court turned to a recent District of Columbia Circuit case, Investors Re-
search Corp. v. SEC,126 for guidance.
In Investors Research Corp., the court first concluded that a violation of
section 17(e)(1) does not require an awareness of wrongdoing. ' 2 7 The Decker
court agreed, on the basis that section 17(e)(1) contains no language requir-
120. 631 F.2d at 1385 n.7.
121. Id. at 1385-86. No objective evidence of market value existed since FIC did not sell the
services in question to anyone but J & L International. Thus, there were no other arm's length
transactions with which one could compare FIC's dealings with J & L International. Id.
122. Id. at 1385 n.8.
123. Id. at 1386.
124. Id. The Decker court quoted Tager v. SEC, 344 F. 2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965): " 'willfully' in
this context means intentionally committing the act which constitutes the violation. There is no
requirement that the actor also be aware that he is violating one of the Rules or Acts."
125. 631 F.2d at 1387.
126. 628 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980).
127. As the Decker court pointed out, 631 F.2d at 1387 n.13, "awareness of wrongdoing" is
not the same as "scienter." "Scienter" is defined in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193
n. 12, as a "mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." The mental state
referred to in Investors Research Corp. and in Decker is merely a general awareness that one is
involved in an improper activity; intent to deceive is not necessary. Decker v. SEC, 631 F.2d at
1386-87; Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d at 178. For a discussion of scienter in the
Tenth Circuit, see Securities, Seventh Annual Tenth Circuit Surve, 58 DEN. L.J. 489 (1981); Note,
Aaron v. SEC- The Seienter Requirement in SEC Injunctive Actions, Seventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survq,
58 DEN. LJ. 493 (1981).
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ing awareness of wrongdoing for primary liability. The United States
Supreme Court has maintained that statutory language principally deter-
mines whether a particular state of mind is a required element of a securities
violation. 128 Since no state of mind requirement is evident from the lan-
guage of section 17(e)(1), a primary violator may be punished even if he was
not aware he was committing a wrongful act.
Both the Investors Research Corp. court and the Decker court agreed, how-
ever, that aiders and abettors of section 17(e)(1) violations constitute a differ-
ent class. In order to punish aiders and abettors, the requisite state of mind,
which is "an awareness of wrongdoing," 129 must be proven, "to insure that
innocent, incidental participants in transactions later found to be illegal are
not subjected to harsh, [sic] civil, criminal, or administrative penalties.
1 30
The Decker court remanded the case to the Commission on this issue as
well, to determine whether Decker possessed an awareness of wrongdoing
sufficient to sustain the commission's censure1 3 1 for aiding and abetting an
ICA violation. 13
2
V. RULE 10B-5 AND LITIGATION-FINANCING SECURITIES
The United States Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores 133 adopted the Birnbaum 134 rule, which limits the class of plaintiffs in
private rule lOb-5 actions to actual purchasers or sellers of securities.
135
Nevertheless, a recent Tenth Circuit case, Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Bader &
Duft>,136 raised the question of whether a defendant in a lawsuit may sue for
injunctive relief under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934'13 and rule lOb-5,13 8 to prevent the plaintiff and the plaintiff's legal
counsel from illegally issuing securities to finance the lawsuit against the de-
fendant. The securities allegedly consisted of agreements to share the fruits
of the litigation. 39
Westinghouse Credit Corporation, the original defendant, acknowl-
edged that the Blue Chip Stamps holding precluded those who did not
purchase or sell securities from suing under rule lOb-5. ' 40 Westinghouse also
acknowledged that it did not purchase or sell the securities offered by Wood-
moor Corporation, the original plaintiff.' 4 ' Westinghouse argued, however,
that it had standing to sue on the ground that the Blue Chip Stamps holding is
128. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695-96 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at
197.
129. See note 127 supra.
130. 631 F.2d at 1388 (quoting Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d at 177).
131. Pursuant to § 203(e)(5) of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(5) (1976).
132. 631 F.2d at 1388-89.
133. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
134. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. dented, 343 U.S. 956
(1952).
135. 421 U.S. at 736, 749.
136. 627 F.2d 221 (10th Cir. 1980).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
138. 17 C.F.R. § 240.I0b-5 (1981).
139. 627 F.2d at 222.




inapplicable to actions where the only relief sought is injunctive. A previous
Tenth Circuit case, Vincent v. Moench, 142 was offered for the proposition that
whenever equitable relief under rule lOb-5 is sought, "any person showing a
'causal connection' between the fraudulent sale of a security and an injury to
himself may invoke federal jurisdiction."'
' 43
The Westinghouse court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Westing-
house's suit. The issue of Westinghouse's standing to sue was resolved pursu-
ant to the Vincent rule rather than the more restrictive Blue Chip Stamps rule:
"[w]e do not feel compelled to here decide whether the rule of Blue Chip
Stamps applies to a private action under Rule lOb-5 which is purely injunc-
tive in nature, since in our view Westinghouse does not have standing even
under the rule of Vincent."'
144
The court pointed out that the "causal connection" rule of Vincent re-
quires a direct association between the fraudulent sale and the plaintiffs
injury.145 Mere allegations of "a scheme to defraud, a deceptive purchase of
a security, and an injury to the plaintiffs"' 46 are not sufficient to invoke
federal jurisdiction; the injury must ensue directly from the fraudulent sale
of a security. According to the court, the Vincent rule, applied to the facts of
Westinghouse, revealed at best an indirect connection between the sale of
profit-sharing agreements and the maintenance of litigation against West-
inghouse 147 (even though Westinghouse alleged that without the sale of the
profit-sharing agreements, Woodmoor would be unable to finance or to pur-
sue its lawsuit against Westinghouse).1 48 Furthermore, the court expressed
doubt that the securities statutes contemplated litigation as an injury worthy
of standing to sue. 1
49
Westinghouse also claimed standing on the ground that Woodmoor's
failure to register its securities and to report to the Commission, as required
by law, 150 deprived Westinghouse of information it could use to defend the
lawsuit.' 5  The court dismissed this assertion on the basis that the registra-
tion and reporting requirements of the securities laws were not designed to
facilitate discovery in securities litigation; rather, they were enacted to help
the investing public make informed investment decisions.' 5 2 Hence, West-
inghouse did not have standing to challenge Woodmoor's failure to register
and report to the Commission.
Westinghouse is a narrow holding and thus leaves many questions unan-
swered. First, and most obvious, is whether the Blue Chip Stamps holding
142. 473 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1973).
143. 627 F.2d at 223 (citing Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d at 435).
144. 627 F.2d at 223.
145. Id. (citing Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d at 435).
146. 627 F.2d at 223.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 222.
149. Id. at 224.
150. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
151. 627 F.2d at 224.
152. Id. (citing SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137, 154 (5th Cir. 1972); Greater
Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 790 (8th Cir. 1967)).
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denies standing to non-purchasers or non-sellers who seek only injunctive
relief under rule lOb-5. But a larger question looms: whether Westinghouse
has demonstrated the need for new remedies for third parties who indirectly
are affected by fraudulent securities transactions in which they have not
partaken.
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